Background: Clinical medicine licenses access to the body and the interior life that would be intolerable in any other setting. It has developed elaborate procedural safeguards around that licence, and almost no vocabulary for what the licence does to the person who holds it or for what is owed afterward.

Approach: This paper reads that problem through a paradox in Deuteronomic law. Two coerced women appear in consecutive chapters with inverted dispositions: the captive of war must be released — ve-shillaḥtah le-nafshah, "you shall send her away to her own soul" (Deut 21:14) — while the violated na'arah may never be released — lo yukhal shallḥah kol yamav (Deut 22:29). Both verses are marked by the same term for the harm done. I trace how the exegetical tradition handles this asymmetry: the Ramban indexing permission to the pathology it concedes; the Netziv (R. Naftali Zvi Yehuda Berlin, 1816–1893) developing an account of the temporal asymmetry of coercion and a categorical refusal of victim-blaming; and the Ra'aya Meheimna at Zohar III 277a–b converting the irrevocable bond into a theology of divine non-abandonment by means of the mashal, which it names as its own method.

Clinical argument: Four elements of the Deuteronomic apparatus have direct clinical analogues that are largely absent from contemporary practice: (1) interposition — a mandated interval between desire and action, against a clinical culture of eleven-second agenda-setting and pathway-determined decisions; (2) compelled witnessing — the licensed party legally obliged to be present to the grief he caused and forbidden to interrupt it; (3) temporal asymmetry of consent — the principle that an encounter beginning in coercion is not retroactively purified by subsequent endorsement, which speaks directly to the well-documented phenomenon of retrospective approval of involuntary treatment; and (4) two distinct obligations of release — one requiring discharge without residual claim, one forbidding discharge altogether. Knowing which of these two governs a given patient is, I argue, a substantial fraction of clinical ethics.

Caution: I argue against the temptation to attribute modern trauma theory to pre-modern exegetes, and against the parallel temptation — structurally identical — by which the clinical case report sublimates a patient into a teaching point. The paper closes by proposing the Netziv's ve-la- a'arah lo ta'aseh davar as a limit on interpretive appropriation in both domains.