Paranoid Psychosis, A First Approach To Lacan

Vazquez-Raposo Alan Suresh*, Dichi-Romero María de los Angeles2, Vargas-Gutierrez Pedro Luis3, García-Cortés Luis Rey4, Carrasco-Carbajal Mario5, Lopez-Miralrio Rodolfo Bernardo6, Cornejo-Vazquez Berenice7 and Mota-García Andres Arturo8

1Medical Assistant Coordination of Health Research, Headquarters of Medical Benefit Services OOAD Regional State of Mexico East IMSS. The Mendoza Law Firm and Van Wielink Brain Clinic.

2Head of the Headquarters of Medical Services OOAD Regional State of Mexico East IMSS.

3Head of the Coordination of Planning and Institutional Liaison, Head of Services of Medical Benefits OOAD Regional State of Mexico East IMSS.

4Head of the Coordination of Health Research and Research Family Medicine Unit No. 193 OOAD Regional State of Mexico East IMSS.

5Clinical Coordinator of Health Education and Research, General Hospital of Zone No. 68 OOAD Regional State of Mexico East IMSS.

6Clinical Coordinator of Health Education and Research, General Hospital of Zone No. 71 OOAD Regional State of Mexico East IMSS.

7Clinical Coordinator of Health Education and Research Family Medicine Unit No. 193 OOAD Regional State of Mexico East IMSS.

8Family Doctor Family Medicine Unit No. 79 OOAD Regional State of Mexico East IMSS.

*Correspondence:
Vazquez-Raposo Alan Suresh, Medical Assistant Coordination of Health Research, Headquarters of Medical Benefit Services OOAD Regional State of Mexico East IMSS. The Mendoza Law Firm and Van Wielink Brain Clinic.

Received: 11 Apr 2023; Accepted: 18 May 2023; Published: 23 May 2023

Keywords

Introduction
"On paranoid psychosis in its relations with personality", is the first text by the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan published in 1932. The work delves fully into personality, its relations with psychosis, the existing differences and similarities not classified in relation to other disorders.

In the introduction, Lacan [1] mentions a psychiatric problem that ignored the differences between "morbid groups, namely (and it does not matter by what name they have been designated, depending on the time, in terminology): the group of dementias..."
and the group of the psychosis.”

The similarity between these morbid groups is based on the detection and the use that is given according to the doctrines, since throughout the history of psychiatry and the knowledge of "mental illnesses" dementias were often confused with psychosis, since they arose in the symptomatology in an equivalent way and it was believed that the origin was caused by an organic deficit or lesion that reduced the ability of a person to have a "normal" picture of personality linked to its definition with the phenomena that they are their own.

The notion of psychosis diagnosed solely by organic deficiency reveals its insufficiency by not contemplating the patient's history and the order of events.

The text exposes the methodological problem since "we did not get lost in one of those investigations on the unknowns of a causal chain, which have led to the bad reputation of the term pathogenesis in medicine." to", [1] that is to say, he uses psychosis to propose a less severe and more contemplative scheme, which attempts to dispense with an explicit definition of personality phenomena.

There is a need to provide an explanation from the epistemology of psychiatric knowledge itself, in this sense Lacan begins to study the discourse of psychosis from the three schools, the French, the German and the Italian.

It is important to refer to Kraepelin since he constitutes an important part in the development of the term 'paranoia', because right in the treatise that Lacan quotes from said author, he comments that the siege comprised mostly in 70 or 80% of the patients were diagnosed with paranoia, such an assertion biased the diagnosis of the condition that was not well defined. Coupled with the fact that Westphal conglomerates the symptom with delirium and intellectual disorder.

Following a historical line, Lacan begins to conceptualize the position of paranoia in Germany using Kraepelin's treatise, because as he comments, the confusion of the definition occurs when Cramer provokes a series of discussions. However, Kraepelin came, "we will say, for the clarity of German conceptions. He himself did not come to define paranoia but in the 1899 edition of the treatise; until then he had remained very close to the current conceptions (ed. of 87, 89 and 93)" [1], his proposal had been distinguished by the study of the evolution of the disease, undoubtedly showing the organic cause that underlies the immediate symptom. Cramer (even with its derivations and complications) defines the term "paranoia", concretized in France, although past authors had already mentioned specific features of paranoia giving it the name of "persecution delusion", work done by Lasègue.

Lacan does not intend to collect the history of the definitions of paranoid psychosis but to resort to this to cross-reference ideas and provide a clearer definition. The need to define psychosis leads to differentiating or clarifying its signs and ruling out any similarity with another condition.

Some of the symptomatic forms of paranoid psychosis that had been falsely built on normal psychology, such as the delusion of interpretation (Serieux and Capgras) and the delusion of imagination (Dupre and Logre). This special clinic was far from the systematized delusions that had materialized. The specificities were hardly recognized and were opposed to Magnan's conceptions that "did not separate from the overall problem of the "delusions of degenerates" [1] the questions of pathogenesis raised by the current paranoid psychosis. On the other hand, they opposed them to the picture of the famous “famous chronic delusion”, which responded to a true psychic neoformation, which invaded, according to a rigorous itinerary, a previously healthy personality.” This position eventually fell behind.

The conceptions of paranoid psychosis would be expressed under the concept of the psychopathogenic, considering the "character" as the focus of study, being more accessible to observe. Dupré contributed to this point by giving a constitutionalist explanation. With Delmas and de Boll we begin to talk about personality, but Montassut is the one who essentially considers aggressiveness and pride as the constitution of the soul, the essential traits of personality.

The proposal that the Germans and French gave was far from the Italian, even when it does not delve into such, Lacan comments that this school weighs up the degenerative problem because it "has managed to put in the best relief the relationships of paranoid thought with modes called prelogical judgment" [1] premise that resorts to a primitive environment, which is why Tanzi and Riva define it as "primitive psychopathy", characterized by an exclusive lesion of the higher intellectual faculties, chronic, without insane evolution, and degenerative origin.

H. Claude mentions the importance of recognizing the differences between paranoid psychosis and paranoid psychosis, taking as delimitation that the latter are characterized by the alleged paranoid constitution, the delusion of interpretation and the delusions of passion. He insists that cases matching Kraepelin's description be called "legitimate paranoia."

The differences of the three schools (the German, the Italian and the French) as Lacan proposes, limit the concept of psychosis, bringing it closer to the notions of personality, with organic symptoms, with descriptions of changes of character that were visible, and with notions of the degeneration of the anomaly to give rise to the concept that would build the psychotic character.

Lacan criticizes the conceptions that positivist psychology gave about personality, where it was thought that the origin of psychosis was due to evolutionary disorders. He provides a definition that allows psychosis to be brought closer to a field of psychiatry.

It begins by introducing the different definitions that have been elaborated on personality, one of them is built according to common experience, which explains it as a synthesis of inner experience, where this is not a given fact but something that enjoys
intentionality, which will guide the subject to adopt certain trends or reject them. Personality is then an ideal, its divergence between synthesis and intentionality raises the possibility of maintaining our desires, dreams and promises over time. This, in addition, enjoys a continuity that allows building the sense of responsibility that as a subject one has with others and with oneself to recognize its existence.

Traditional metaphysics conceives of the person as distant from the individual, a substantial importance to the dignity that is acquired on the condition of being born a man. Unlike scientific psychology that considers the subject as a succession, a place where facts fit, personality has its possibility as each character can be measurable or quantifiable.

When the personality has been analyzed introspectively, it has referred to forces that put the real self and the ideal self in conflict. The ideal self is a set of beliefs that, when in contact with reality, vanish. Some synthesis attempts, which represent conflict, failure and crisis, lead to a transformation of the personality, where it is no longer probable that the subject will take responsibility for their desires, dreams, projects, etc., leaving aside their continuity over time and considering to the person as something that breaks.

From an objective analysis, personality has been defined as a development, an ordered set of structures, which, although they carry a sequence, their fulfillment also guarantees a decisive progress in events in an objective and affective reality. So then the states of the personality are the fulfillment of one step to another and it is understandable in the others, it makes sense without having knowledge of the succession. Intentionality here may not take place, since the voluntary act of the personality cannot objectively be given a place.

Trying to make a merely objective definition, then for Lacan personality implies; 1) biographical development, 2) self-concept, and 3) tension in social relationships.

Lacan's position towards the schools of scientific psychology presumes not to be founded on the conceptions linked to psychological structuring. As well as not sharing the idea of an individual consciousness, while personality is not a phenomenon that can be reduced to the processes of recollection either.

So far these scientific definitions are not opposed to what Lacan will define as personality, however its character becomes confusing and insufficient to explain the phenomena that comprise it.

The psychogenic is a concept that becomes relevant from the place in which it is supported as an explanation to the etiology of the symptom, this arises from the conditions of the psyche and the soul. Although this could come to rest on the organic and the physiological, it is important to make a distinction between its pathological character and consider whether the condition is due to organic or psychogenic issues.

The investigations carried out on psychogenic factors for Lacan can explain the significance given to psychosis, however, the question arises to what extent it can be interpreted from the psychoanalytic technique without leaving aside the other sources through which has explained the phenomenon; remembering only as an axis of interpretation that up to this point Lacan tries to compose a definition of the merely psychiatric phenomenon.

A science that tried to explain the differences in personality was characterology, however for Lacan it is difficult to achieve its goal, because a causal relationship between psychosis and a defined personality type cannot be made. The organic structures and elements do not claim to present themselves in the same way in different individuals, the impossibility of deciding on a determining character for the psychotic structure being a problem.

In contrast to the constitutionalist doctrine that contemplates all those innate differences, whether biopsychosocial or hereditary, which nevertheless have the power to organize personality and classify it. So that psychopathologies should be explained by the contact that the subject has or does not have with reality. Psychois does not recognize a definable characterology or mechanisms of the personality that determines it, is precipitated to be constituted psychogenetically.

Lacan is concise and mentions the relevance that the study of the different conceptions that people have about personality has up to now. Since this is going to be affected by paranoid psychosis. None of the different conceptions of personality could explain the appearance of paranoid delusion and it cannot even be accounted for through organic conditions. It is necessary to highlight once again the definitions that Kraepelin makes regarding psychosis, where although "reality is perverted in psychosis, it is also true that it maintains a "conserved" order in thinking, acting and wanting".

Previously, Lacan had spoken to us about an intentionality that will be decisive for the development of the personality. If we understand that psychosis are the development of the personality, as Lacan mentions, then they are loaded with the history and previous experiences of the subject. That is, from this relationship between psychosis and personality, we can understand that delusion arises as a condition that is related to the character of the subject. Lacan mentions the Kraepelian definition of paranoia as legitimate. In this definition, reference begins to be made to the psychogenic aspects on which paranoid psychosis rests. That is, considering the importance of the historical and intentional aspects of the subject.

We can well refer then that the delusion arises from the conflicts that arise in the personality. The different types of delusion defined by Kraepelin, analyzed by Lacan, can only be explained from the vital conflicts, the intimate elaboration of these conflicts and social reactions. In this way we say that the delusion is assumed from the beginning, it does not question the reality of what is seen. Unlike hallucination, where the subject comes to question whether what he sees is real or not.

In psychosis, the delusion then arises as a disturbance of the...
self with the outside world. Delirium is a tear in the link that the subject makes with reality, becoming a patch that tells us about an unconscious knowledge. The delusion arises from the failures that daily life represents for the subject. Differentiating paranoid psychosis from systematized delusions leads us to think that the literalness that Lacan takes up at this time is the already consulted knowledge of the French school.

The French school tells us about a constitutional doctrine of delirium. These delusions are founded under which is their symptom, the interpretation. What is curious and what might astonish us is that later Lacan will refer us to certain literary works in which it could be said that the authors are "delusional". The delusion of interpretation, we understand as morbid because of the way in which it guides the ideology of delusion and the history of the subject. The constitutionalist doctrine considers that the character, all the experiences and tendencies that already existed, prepare the formation of the delusion and in its persistence the irradiation.

The proper value of the symptoms of psychosis must not be lost because a delusion is not an object of the same nature as a physical lesion, a painful point or a motor disorder. Even more: the delusion does not express this disorder directly: it signifies it through a social symbolism. This symbolism is not univocal, and has to be interpreted. When in an apparently subnormal mechanism we discover a degraded form of a mechanism of a well-recognized morbid nature, we have matter for a finer semiological analysis, the only way to make observation agree with real mechanisms.

As the clinic shows in the neuroses, the psychoanalyst needs the discourse of the patient considered psychotic in the transference situation to advance a reflection in this field, an essential condition to consider an experience as psychoanalytic. This same observation, although within the doctrinal contradictions of the thesis, does not escape Lacan [1], who points out: "Let's observe to finish, that if psychoanalysis has not been applied in the case of our patient, this omission, not due to our will, defines at the same time the scope and value of our work. In this text, Lacan remains in the psychiatric discourse, even when he explicitly proposes to overcome the nosographyism that permeates it, and investigate a nosology inspired by psychoanalysis, which finally leads him to found a new clinical entity in the heterogeneous group of paranoia. If we think that language refers, then we fall into madness, because language does not represent, what it represents is the object, the thing by itself that does nothing and waits.

As we already mentioned, although Lacan remained in the discourse of psychiatry, he begins to point out the importance of language in the construction of delusion as a symptom of psychosis. He speaks to us of language as taking it as part of social relations. Through this you can have a conception of yourself and others. However, as we have already said, the psychiatric discourse does not see language as a reliable element that accounts for the psychotic structure, only if we talk about it through the acts, events, and reactions of the patient.

Here Lacan resumes the constitutionalist conceptions of the French school in which the development of delusion is considered as an organic process similar to the development of paranoia. The important thing to rescue is the concept of fruitful moment. If we consider that delusion is a process, this concept gives us an account of the evolution of delusion and where it is created. In such a way that the fertile moments of psychosis is technically identical to the development of organic psychosis. Up to this point we do not find differences in how the German and French schools conceive delusion, since this is the symptom of psychosis.

Lacan's position is to generate a critique of the definitions that gave paranoid psychosis a characterological value and without morbidity, developing a specific path where there was no relationship between character and disease due to the vast complexity that it represented methodologically to define what character defined. to the structure of the subject. This represents a complication, the historical burden that the disease concept has does not establish the possibility of thinking about the paranoid constitution or its development related to character. The break between these two concepts, comments Lacan [1], “tends to get confused”. In this sense, Lacan tries -successfully- to get away from constitutionalist psychogenesis using the ideas and methods that Kretschmer gives.

Thus, paranoia "depends above all on a situation to which the patient reacts with his psychosis, and on the internal conflict between a felt inferiority and a reactionary exaltation of the feeling of himself, without forgetting, of course, that this conflict is exacerbated by external circumstances" [1], emphasizing the reactional genesis of psychosis as a guide that opposes the ideas of theorists of the paranoid constitution and the theorists who signified it as the nucleus of the delusional conviction that would be represented as an automatism mental or organomechanical.

The path that Lacan builds from the reactional genesis allows him to accentuate the reactionary with the possibility of introducing the spectrum of the social to the diagnosis, while he will focus on focusing on specific situations. From Kraepelin's notion, paranoia is linked to the personality of the individual, but it is with Génill-Perrin that Lacan tries to exponentialize his explanation, producing the opposite effect. By delegating Kraepelin's position it is possible to introduce the field of personality.

The approaches to Jasper's postulations are elementary to achieve what Lacan intended, since he provides a model that allows the analysis of understanding relationships by enabling the definition of development, conceptual structures, the social environment of the personality and if it is he catalogs normal and disagreement in terms of his interpretation of it. The idea of reaction must be taken into account as part of personality development. It is necessary to understand that what abruptly crosses out the development of the personality is the process, an idea that Lacan takes up from Jaspers, to conceptualize the paranoia of self-punishment avoiding the organic factor as the cause. He concretely presides over the Jasperian notion since he does not articulate a totality that explains the para-noias.
Lacan thoroughly analyzes and criticizes the Kraepelian concept of paranoia to conclude that information from experience is insidious, as there are eventually phases. The notion of a fertile moment is extremely important, since for Lacan it is the moment where paranoia begins. Thus, a priori psychosis has an onset, a trigger point. This notion will be evoked in the Aimée case, since it indicates "it is impossible to accurately locate, from the anamnesis, the date and geographical location of certain intuitions, illusions of memory, convivial resentments and imaginary objectifications that they can only be related to the fertile moment of delusion taken as a whole” [2] the idea and constitution of paranoid psychosis is located when the object tends to be confused with the self, simultaneously exceeding it in fantasy, when it appears dismantled in the specters of unreality. Why use the idea of fertile moment? The product can only be realized via fertilization, so for Lacan it would be understandable to recognize that key moment to start the delusion, that reality that wanders hesitantly in the self, that hesitant reality is the support of the delirium, it is virginity waiting for set in motion the possibility of the delusion that announces the overflow of psychosis.

Thus, we suppose that Lacan, when doing a detailed reading of Kretschmer, finds the concept of reaction that gives him guidelines to assert the discontinuity, outside of himself, of the personality, and to emphasize the possibility that paranoid psychosis is not related to the personality, but rather that constitutes the personality, forms part of it in the accompaniment.

Aimée Case, Representation of a Psychoisis

The Aimée case is the meeting point between everything that had previously been studied about psychosis and what Lacan wanted to understand about it. Once we come to the reading of the case, it is then that we realize the relevance that Lacan has for understanding as a psychiatrist what the various schools proposed to understand as psychosis. French psychiatry had not integrated German ideas about the conceptions of madness. The investigation that Lacan develops on the Aimée case reveals that psychiatry ignored many data that could concur with psychoanalytic investigations. This allows us to understand the psychological theories of personality that consider other aspects such as personal history and family, as well as to understand and make clear the conflict that psychosis represents.

The case makes it possible to understand that the paranoid psychosis that Aimée presented is not articulated in the premises that French psychiatry previously tried to resolve. Lacan allows us to understand that the symptom is the paranoid delusion and shows us the reactions of the personality as a symbolic product. We can understand that the "self-punishment paranoia" or "self-punishment" that the case represents did not fit with everything previously developed by the French school, thus becoming an important part of integrating the German positions, where the theory of paranoia does not have to be a field of classifications, but rather to understand that the nosographic pictures were placed for the benefit of psychogenesis, which established the evolution of delusion.

Therefore Aimée, is the nickname given to the case and which was also the name of one of the main characters in the novels she wrote. She was a peasant, lived in a town far from the city and since she was little she dreamed of moving and living in the city. Being the daughter of a delusional woman, Aimée manages to live under the anguish of different situations that life itself poses. She got married, had children and city friends, we must also mention how important it was for her to become a great writer, not so far from the ideas that modernity and the Belle Époque propose as a project of modernity in the city and how it is configured according to those demands.

Aimée forms a family and gets married, going to live in the city, once home she becomes pregnant by her husband and periods of anguish begin, which is present in Aimée's dreams and hallucinations. She begins to have delusions of plotting, daytime persecutions and nightmares in which she dreams of her dying baby. The moment in which her reality becomes intolerable is when her dead daughter is born. After this distressing event, her delusions begin to worsen and she blames a woman who had been her best friend for being responsible for the death of her son. Later she becomes pregnant again and begins to have delusional ideas again, once her son is born, she does not separate from him and has the purpose of protecting her son from everything, with the previous experience, Aimée does not go away from the delusions and is admitted under the diagnosis of systematicatized delusion, paranoid dementia and with delusions of interpretation with episodic hallucinations. The dream anxieties do not disappear, Aimée continues dreaming of coffins and the death of her son, she wants to leave as soon as she can, move to the USA, but she is admitted, later she leaves the clinic and is transferred to a job in Paris.

Once installed in her job, she begins to listen to conversations from her colleagues and in one they talk about woman Z, from there she links it and begins to believe that the actress is the one who has been threatening her well-being and that of her son, Mrs. Z was now responsible for the danger her little boy was in along with some colleagues from work. And she, some time ago, had believed she had read a story in the newspaper in which she recognized herself and saw a threat to her son. Aimée again hospitalized and being treated by Lacan, she begins to talk about her family history and her concurrent dreams in which her son dies in different ways. She plays a relevant role in what Aimée suffers is the family history that precedes her, since her older sister dies due to an oversight of her mother, falling into an oven, she died burned. This is associated with the obsessive care that she had with her own son and the representations that she had of a mother, a representation in which careless, frivolous and criminal mothers torment her, a position from which "self-punishment" is affirmed, since she, having gone through a death experience, bears the blame. Aimée has a sister who takes care of her home and her son’s care when she is born, she does not separate from him and has the purpose of protecting her son from everything, with the previous experience, Aimée does not go away from the delusions and is admitted under the diagnosis of systematicatized delusion, paranoid dementia and with delusions of interpretation with episodic hallucinations. The dream anxieties do not disappear, Aimée continues dreaming of coffins and the death of her son, she wants to leave as soon as she can, move to the USA, but she is admitted, later she leaves the clinic and is transferred to a job in Paris.
the guilt. Aimée has a sister who takes care of her home and her son's care when she is in confinement, she is the surrogate mother of her son. Aimée had always wanted to be like her and we could well refer from a Freudian conception this sister had positioned herself as her ideal of her self. position from which the "self-punishment" is affirmed, since she, having gone through a death experience, bears the guilt. Aimée has a sister who takes care of her home and cares for her son when she is in confinement, she is the surrogate mother of her son. Aimée had always wanted to be like her and we could well refer from a Freudian conception that this sister had positioned herself as her ideal of her self.

Tormented, Aimée insists on the death of a child in her delusions, she believes she finds someone responsible, who, although it is Mrs. Z, whom she decides to attack and stab, is also another figure that is constituted as an ideal of the self. In the paranoia of self-punishment, the punishment is directed towards oneself, Mrs. Z is just that mirror in which Aimée would have wanted to see herself, that precipitate of identifications allows us to think that in reality, in the delirium, what she is persecuting is herself. She cannot bear the anguish that guilt generates in her, she is traversed by those singularities that torment her history and the history of her family.

In psychosis, issues are at stake that are not curable and serious for psychiatry in terms of the symptoms that they assume, since the rationality of the acts and the responsibility that the subject assumes when carrying them out is analyzed, even if it may be due to a disorder organic in the patient. In his thesis, Lacan tells us about the fertile moment, that moment of rupture in the life of the patient that poses a situation of discontinuity from which delusions begin to become more recurrent.

Although we could mention a fruitful moment in Aimée's delusions, it is important to highlight that the symptom that she constitutes is also due to that insurmountable trauma of birth, that condition of being born in a family where the inheritance of psychic life has its effects on Aimée, since this was never the object of desire.

Precisely understanding Lacan's approach to the text (and how it is that he constantly used psychoanalytic theory) built the elements in the case of Aimée approaching the family and understanding the condition of delusion as a product of the environment and family history, trying to see the possible causes. This case reveals a certain degree of approach to delusion in a more constitutive way, what it is in itself, the construction of delusion and its value, the intertwining between the characters and their elements, the baggage of the patient's life, understanding delusion as a structure. The case of Aimée shows the whole framework of possibilities that surround paranoia. The manifestations in the case were clear such as the ideas of prejudice, jealousy, manic ideas about the character of royal blood, etc.

Lacan makes it very clear that he bases much of the construction of the history of the Aimée case on the way in which Freud does it with Schreber, although the problem is that the theory and the clinical case are not divided, that is why in the construction Lacan draws completely from psychoanalysis to ensure that libidinal fixations are the main axis of the case. That is why he places Aimée's psychotic disturbances as a problem in the register of the imaginary, but which is not only developed there, it is even possible to think of Aimée's delusions as a delusional metaphor, which supports the intertwining with another register, the symbolic, and precisely the passage between one and the other is the cause per se of psychosis.

In other words, Lacan explains that the constitution of psychosis in Aimée is not necessarily in the imaginary, but is linked to foreclosure, a concept that Lacan develops commenting that it situates signifying causality, since to the extent that this signification it gives rise to the signifier of the father, it will constantly produce the return of images, a hole, in the case guilt constantly appears as the axis.

**Conclusion**

Lacan's proposal occurs in the function of the word and listens and then the passage to the act of change, Lacan realizes that Aimée's symptoms disappear depending on the context, in the case Aimée was while she was imprisoned for the crime of attempted murder, this led Lacan to comment on the paranoia of self-punishment, which consisted of the patient's need to enter the law and its punishment.

Aimée felt a thunderous guilt and when she was punished and locked up, her symptoms disappeared, giving rise to the cure, the cure only showed itself in the relief of the punishment, so the punitive paranoid psychosis demonstrated the discontinuity of the act, the subject enters and exits the scene and builds another. This is the brilliant one with which Lacan manages to separate two constructs between medicine and psychoanalysis, since he manages to realize that the psychotic trait was only cured in punishment and said punishment was presented in the Law, the need to enter the law.

The resolving value is important because Lacan managed to identify that Aimée's delusions and fantasies could also be caused by historical and family aspects, no longer biological, in this case there was an annulment of access to the discourse and the only alternative to enter the speech is to blame Therein lies the importance of understanding paranoid psychosis and personality as linked elements but that do not necessarily coexist one on top of the other, rather they are intertwined, tensing the subject to his desire.

**References**