Research Article ISSN 2641-4333

Neurology - Research & Surgery

The Prosthetic Self: Physical and Spiritual Limb Replacement as Parallel Modalities of Reconstruction Following Trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

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Received: 18 Apr 2026; **Accepted:** 17 May 2026; **Published:** 28 May 2026

Citation: Julian Y Ungar-Sargon. The Prosthetic Self: Physical and Spiritual Limb Replacement as Parallel Modalities of Reconstruction Following Trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Neurol Res Surg. 2026; 9(3): 1-14.

ABSTRACT

The literature on prosthetic rehabilitation has, since the inaugural edition of Prosthetics and Orthotics International in 1977, repeatedly emphasized that the success of physical prosthesis depends less on mechanical fit than on the psychological process by which the amputee comes to invest the device with selfhood. Desmond and MacLachlan, in their 25-year review of the journal, articulated this as the prosthesis becoming a "psychically invested aspect or extension of self" [1]. This essay proposes that the same architecture describes what occurs spiritually after trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The pre-traumatic self is amputated; what fills the absence is not merely an external theological or ritual replacement but a structure that must be psychically invested before it can become constitutive of selfhood. I term this construct the spiritual prosthesis. Drawing on the clinical literature on prosthetic adjustment, contemporary trauma psychology, Lurianic Kabbalah, post-Holocaust theology, and my prior work on hermeneutic medicine [2-11], I develop five parallel axes between physical and spiritual prosthetic integration: disruption and reconstruction of the inner imago, symbolic ambivalence, phantom phenomena, cosmesis versus integration, and lifespan fluctuation. I then confront the strongest objection to the metaphor — that physical prostheses are fitted from outside while spiritual reorganization is irreducibly internal — and argue that the asymmetry collapses under scrutiny of the prosthetic literature itself. The essay concludes with clinical implications for trauma-informed hermeneutic medicine.

Keywords

Prosthesis, Post-traumatic stress disorder, Hermeneutic medicine, Tzimtzum, Shevirat ha-kelim, Vav ketia, Lurianic Kabbalah, Post-Holocaust theology, Embodied theology, Sacred brokenness, Piaseczner Rebbe.

Introduction

The Question Behind the Prosthesis

When Sidney Fishman opened the inaugural issue of Prosthetics and Orthotics International in 1977 with the observation that "successful fitting of a prosthesis lies in the psychology of the wearer rather than in any physical problem" [12], he was not voicing a fringe sentiment. He was identifying what would become, across the following half-century of rehabilitation research, a

persistent and uncomfortable truth: that the mechanical question of how a device replaces a limb is subordinate to the psychological question of how a person comes to live with that device as part of themselves. The technology has advanced spectacularly since Fishman wrote. High-tech prostheses now offer myoelectric control, osseointegration, and sensory feedback that approach the function of the lost limb [13]. And yet the rehabilitation literature continues to report what Fishman already knew: a substantial proportion of amputees reject or under-utilize prostheses that fit them perfectly, and the deciding variable lies somewhere in the patient's relationship to the device rather than in the device itself [1].

Desmond and MacLachlan, in their twenty-five-year review of the literature published in Prosthetics and Orthotics International, gave this insight its most precise formulation. After surveying papers on body image, coping, developmental considerations, psychosocial wellbeing, quality of life, and the psychological factors that precede amputation, they concluded that the practitioner must recognize the amputee's relationship to the prosthesis "as a psychically invested aspect or extension of self, and its potential to symbolise how they relate to the world" [1]. The same physical device, they noted, "may embody ability for one individual, because they feel it enables them to perform certain physical functions and social roles, whereas the same prosthesis may embody disability for someone else because they view it as prohibiting those same functions and roles" [1]. The prosthesis, in other words, is never neutral. It enters the patient's life as a foreign object and either becomes part of the self through a process of psychical investment, or remains an external appliance — sometimes useful, sometimes resented, always something other than the body.

This essay begins from a question that the prosthetic literature has not asked but which its findings invite: what if the architecture of prosthetic integration — disruption of body image, phantom presence of the absent limb, symbolic ambivalence of the replacement, the difference between cosmetic appearance and true incorporation and the fluctuation of all of these across the lifespan — describes not only what happens after physical amputation but also what happens after psychological trauma? What if the survivor of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is fitted with what we might call a spiritual prosthesis: a reconstructed theological framework, a renewed ritual practice, a community of belonging, a narrative of self, a felt presence of the divine, through which they relearn how to inhabit a world from which something irreducible has been removed? And what if the same psychological dynamics that determine whether a prosthetic limb is integrated as extension of self or remains an empty sleeve apply, with appropriate translation, to the spiritual structures that survivors of trauma must somehow come to wear?

My contention is that they do. I will argue here that the metaphor of prosthesis is not merely illustrative but structurally precise: that the survivor of trauma, like the survivor of amputation, faces a task of integration that is neither the recovery of what was lost nor the simple acquisition of a replacement, but a more complex hermeneutic process by which an external structure is invested with the survivor's own subjectivity until it becomes — or fails to become — constitutive of selfhood. I will further argue that the Lurianic theological vocabulary I have developed across prior work [2,5-7] offers a precise idiom for this process: that tzimtzum names the clinician's methodological posture, shevirat ha-kelim names the trauma, tikkun names the prosthetic reconstruction, vav ketia (the fractured vav) names the integrated self that retains its fracture, and hester panim names the phantom presence of the divine after the survivor's theological world has been amputated.

The essay proceeds in eight movements. After this introduction, I review the architecture of prosthetic integration as the rehabilitation literature has described it, drawing chiefly on Desmond and MacLachlan's synthesis but also on the longer literature they survey. I then turn to trauma and PTSD, arguing that the shattered-assumptions model of Janoff-Bulman [14] and its contemporary descendants describe a process structurally homologous to physical amputation. I develop the construct of the spiritual prosthesis, distinguish it from related concepts (defense mechanism, coping strategy, religious belief), and identify its modalities. I then work through five axes along which the physical and spiritual prostheses map onto one another. I retrieve the Lurianic architecture that my prior work has developed and show how it provides the theological grammar for what the clinical literature has been describing in psychological vocabulary. I then turn to the strongest objection — the asymmetry between externally fitted prosthesis and internally constructed faith — and meet it head-on. A short case illustration from the Piaseczner Rebbe's Warsaw Ghetto theology shows the construct in operation under historical conditions of extremity. The essay closes with clinical implications.



(a) (b)

The Architecture of Prosthetic Integration

Desmond and MacLachlan organize the twenty-five-year literature into six thematic categories: body image and cosmesis; coping, adjustment, and acceptance; developmental issues; psychosocial wellbeing; quality of life; and psychological factors leading to amputation [1]. Beneath this taxonomy, however, a more unified architecture emerges, and it is this architecture I want to draw out before turning to the trauma parallel. The architecture has five elements.

Disruption of Body Image

The first element is the disruption of body image. Narang and Jape, in a retrospective study of 14,400 civilian disabled patients, observed that traumatic amputation produces a "sudden and dramatic physical loss" that is "unsettling in the extreme" [15]. The amputee's mental representation of the body — what cognitive neuroscientists now call the body schema and the body image — was constructed across years of embodied experience and cannot be revised quickly. The limb is absent in fact; in representation it persists. This persistence is not metaphorical. Melzack and colleagues demonstrated that approximately one-third of individuals born with congenital limb deficiency or undergoing amputation before age five develop phantom sensations of the limb [16], a finding that overturned the prevailing belief that phantom phenomena require prior embodied experience of the limb. The phantom is not a memory of what was there; it is a structural feature of how the nervous system represents the body, and it persists even when there is nothing for it to be a phantom of.

Body image disturbance, then, is not a matter of the amputee being unable to "accept" the loss in some abstract psychological sense. It is the very concrete experience of inhabiting a body whose inner representation no longer corresponds to its outer reality, while the inner representation refuses to update. Whatever fills the absence — whether a prosthesis or, in many cases, an empty sleeve — must be incorporated into a representation that already contains a phantom limb. The prosthesis is therefore fitted not to the residuum alone but to a body image that is itself in motion.

The Prosthesis as Psychically Invested Extension of Self

The second element is the key one for our purposes. Desmond and MacLachlan, drawing on a range of papers including those of Millstein, van Lunteren, Furst, and Humphrey [17-19], converge on the formulation that the prosthesis can become "a psychically invested aspect or extension of self" [1]. This phrase, which I will return to repeatedly, names something subtle. It is not the claim that the prosthesis is psychologically important — that would be trivially true. It is the claim that the boundary between self and prosthesis can dissolve such that the device is included within the person's subjective experience of their own body and agency. The successful prosthesis is one the user does not have to think about. It is one through which they think, walk, grasp, perform. It is one whose loss would be experienced as a second amputation.

This is a strong claim, and it has the consequence that the clinician cannot install integration. The prosthetist can fit a device to the residuum; only the user can invest the device with selfhood. This is why van Lunteren and colleagues, in their field evaluation of arm prostheses, found that the cosmetic function — how the prosthesis appeared to others — was for many users the most highly valued attribute [18]. Cosmesis matters not because amputees are vain but because the prosthesis is doing the work of presenting the integrated body to the world, and a prosthesis that fails cosmetically cannot easily be invested as part of self.

Symbolic Ambivalence

The third element is that the prosthesis carries symbolic meaning that varies from patient to patient, sometimes radically. Desmond and MacLachlan note that "a given prosthesis may embody ability for one individual, because they feel it enables them to perform certain physical functions and social roles, whereas the same prosthesis may embody disability for someone else because they view it as prohibiting those same functions and roles" [1]. The same device — same materials, same fit, same function — can be experienced as restoration or as marker of loss, depending on the patient's interpretation. Chadderton, writing as a long-term amputee himself, observed that World War II trans-radial amputees who had never worn a prosthesis "had still not become used to the loss of cosmesis involved in the empty sleeve" [20], indicating that the absence of a prosthesis also carries symbolic weight, and the choice not to wear is itself an act of meaning-making.

The prosthesis, in other words, is hermeneutically open. It does not arrive with its meaning fixed. The meaning is constructed in the encounter between device and user, and that encounter is shaped by the user's pre-existing world of meanings: their occupation, their gender, their social roles, their religious and cultural commitments, their relationship to their body, their history with the trauma that produced the amputation. This is why two amputees with similar injuries and similar prostheses can have radically different rehabilitation outcomes. The mechanical input is the same; the hermeneutic processing differs.

Cosmesis as Social Negotiation

The fourth element is the cosmetic dimension. Burger and Marincek noted that "a large number of amputees are very sensitive about their cosmetic appearance" and that the reactions of society to the amputee are closely tied to the cosmetic appearance of the prosthesis [21]. Cosmesis is therefore not a frivolous concern but a social-relational one. The prosthesis mediates the patient's presentation to others. When it succeeds cosmetically, it allows the patient to be seen as a person rather than as an amputee. When it fails, the patient is marked, and the marking compounds the original loss.

There is, however, a complication, and it is here that the prosthetic literature becomes most clinically rich. A prosthesis that succeeds cosmetically without being psychically invested produces a particular kind of failure: the patient appears whole but does not feel whole. The empty sleeve is filled but not inhabited. This phenomenon — what I will later call cosmetic theology when I extend the metaphor — is documented though under-named in the rehabilitation literature. It manifests as patients who wear their prostheses dutifully in public but remove them at home, who report no satisfaction with their fittings despite high observer ratings, who decline to upgrade to better devices because the existing one performs the social function of appearing as a limb. Cosmesis, in such cases, has been achieved without integration.

Lifespan Fluctuation

The fifth and final element is that the amputee's relation to the

prosthesis is not fixed at the moment of fitting but continues to develop and change across the lifespan. Desmond and MacLachlan note explicitly that this relationship "may change and fluctuate throughout the lifespan" as the patient ages, encounters new losses, transitions through developmental stages, or reinterprets the prosthesis in light of accumulated experience [1]. Rybarczyk and colleagues found that older adults often experience amputation less catastrophically than younger adults because the loss is perceived as relatively "on time" with the expected losses of aging, whereas for a young person the amputation arrives as fundamentally out of sequence with life [22]. Fisher and Hanspal, similarly, observed that traumatic amputation at any age produces body image difficulties but that these are more striking in younger patients whose body image was less prepared to accommodate change [23].

What emerges is a picture of integration as a process rather than an event. The prosthesis is not installed and then finished. It is taken up, lived with, sometimes rejected, sometimes re-embraced, modified, mourned, replaced. The successful integration is not a stable end-state but a relationship that the patient sustains over time, often with help, and one that can deteriorate as well as deepen.

Synthesis

Pulling these five elements together, what the prosthetic literature describes is the following. A traumatic event removes a limb. The patient is left with a body whose internal representation contains a phantom of the absent limb and whose external reality must be reconstructed around the absence. A prosthesis is offered. The prosthesis can become part of the self through a process of psychical investment that depends on the patient's interpretation of the device, the device's cosmetic and functional adequacy, and the patient's ongoing developmental and relational context. The same prosthesis can succeed for one patient and fail for another. Success is not measured by mechanical fit alone but by whether the prosthesis is invested as extension of self. And success, once achieved, is not stable; it must be sustained across changing life circumstances. This architecture, I will now argue, describes the post-traumatic process as well.



Trauma and the Amputated Self

The vocabulary of amputation is not new to trauma theory. Judith Herman, in Trauma and Recovery, writes of trauma as severing — severing the connection between self and world, self and body, self and others [24]. Bessel van der Kolk, in The Body Keeps the Score, describes the post-traumatic subject as inhabiting a body that no longer feels safely their own, a body whose nervous system has been altered such that the pre-traumatic self is, in some functional sense, no longer accessible [25]. Janoff-Bulman, whose Shattered Assumptions remains foundational, frames trauma as the destruction of three fundamental assumptions: that the world is benevolent, that the world is meaningful, and that the self is worthy [14]. After trauma these assumptions cannot simply be restored. They must be rebuilt — or replaced — through a process the survivor undertakes over years, often with professional help.

My own work on PTSD has developed an integrative model that situates the neurobiological signature of post-traumatic states within a broader account of the human person as embodied, narrative, and relationally constituted [2-4]. The Integrative PTSD Healing Center model I have proposed elsewhere articulates a three-tier treatment approach bridging neuroscience, spirituality, and alternative medicine [5,26]. What I want to suggest here is that this integrative framework is itself a prosthetic in the sense I am developing: it is an externally articulated structure of care that the survivor takes up and invests with their own subjectivity until it becomes part of how they live their post-traumatic life, or fails to do so.

The Pre-Traumatic Self as Amputated Limb

Consider what happens to the self after trauma. The survivor retains continuous biographical memory; they know who they were. But the way of being-in-the-world that constituted their pre-traumatic self is no longer accessible in the way it once was. The felt sense of safety, the capacity for trust, the assumption that one's body is one's own — these are not just beliefs the survivor has lost; they are capacities that have been removed. The pre-traumatic self is, in this sense, amputated. It can be remembered but not re-inhabited.

And like the phantom limb, the pre-traumatic self continues to be represented even though it is no longer there. The survivor reaches for it — in the half-second before waking, in the rare moment when nothing triggers a flashback, in the early stages of therapy when the work feels like it might restore them to who they were. The pre-traumatic self is the phantom limb of PTSD. It aches. Its presence-in-absence is one of the most painful aspects of post-traumatic life because it represents both what is gone and what cannot be fully relinquished.

This is more than analogy. The neurobiological literature on PTSD now consistently describes the disorder as involving a fundamental alteration in the brain's representation of self, threat, and time [25,27]. The amygdala's threat-detection system remains chronically over-active; the prefrontal cortex's capacity to contextualize and inhibit threat responses is diminished; the hippocampus's encoding of memory as past rather than present is

impaired. The survivor lives in a body whose self-representation has been structurally changed. As with phantom limb pain, the alteration is not a memory of trauma but a reorganization of how the system represents the body and its world. Recent neuroscience research validates this network-based account of post-traumatic states and supports holistic treatment approaches that work at the level of the embodied subject rather than addressing trauma symptoms in isolation [10].

The Phantom World

What is amputated in trauma is not only a pre-traumatic self but a pre-traumatic world. Janoff-Bulman's shattered assumptions are world-assumptions: the world is benevolent, meaningful, and the self is worthy of being in it [14]. When these assumptions are shattered, the survivor inhabits not only an altered self but an altered world. The world that existed before — the world in which one could walk down a particular street, or trust a particular person, or believe a particular thing about God or country or family — that world is gone. And yet it is not entirely gone, because the survivor remembers it, anticipates it, sometimes briefly inhabits it before some cue returns them to the post-traumatic world.

The phantom world, like the phantom limb, is one of the most poignant features of trauma. It is what the survivor mourns when they cannot articulate what exactly they are mourning. It is what makes "going back to normal" both desired and impossible. It is also what makes the spiritual prosthesis necessary, because the survivor cannot return to the pre-traumatic world but must somehow construct a way of being in the world that has replaced it.

The Survivor as Theologian

Judith Herman observes that "the traumatic event challenges an ordinary person to become a theologian, a philosopher, and a jurist", called upon "to articulate the values and beliefs that she once held and that the trauma destroyed" [24]. This formulation captures something the clinical literature on PTSD has been slow to fully integrate: that the post-traumatic task is not only psychological but ontological. The survivor must rebuild a way of inhabiting reality. This rebuilding cannot be accomplished through symptom reduction alone, however necessary symptom reduction may be. It requires the construction of structures of meaning capable of supporting a livable post-traumatic existence.

This is where my prior work on hermeneutic medicine becomes directly relevant [6,11]. If the patient is to be treated as a sacred text requiring interpretive wisdom, then the post-traumatic patient is a text that has been violently re-written, and the clinical task is to participate in the interpretation by which the survivor makes sense of the re-written text without pretending that the original is still legible. The clinician cannot provide the meaning. But the clinician can hold the space in which meaning is constructed, much as the prosthetist holds the space in which a device is fitted to a residuum it cannot itself replace.



The Spiritual Prosthesis: Definition and Modalities

What, then, is a spiritual prosthesis? I propose the following definition: a spiritual prosthesis is an externally articulated structure of meaning, practice, relation, or presence that the survivor of trauma takes up and psychically invests until it becomes constitutive of their post-traumatic selfhood. The structure is not the survivor's creation ex nihilo; it is offered from outside — by a tradition, a community, a therapist, a teacher, a text, a ritual. But it does not become a prosthesis until the survivor invests it with their own subjectivity. Until that investment occurs, the structure remains an external appliance: useful perhaps, but not part of the self.

This definition allows us to distinguish the spiritual prosthesis from several related but distinct constructs. It is not a defense mechanism, because defense mechanisms operate unconsciously and protect the self from acknowledging what has happened; the spiritual prosthesis presupposes acknowledgement and is taken up consciously, however gradually. It is not merely a coping strategy, because coping strategies aim to manage symptoms whereas the prosthesis aims to reconstitute the self that experiences the symptoms. It is not simply religious belief, because belief can be held without investment — many trauma survivors continue to affirm their pre-traumatic beliefs while no longer being able to live by them, which is the spiritual analogue of wearing the prosthesis in public but removing it at home. The prosthesis is what religious belief or therapeutic framework becomes when it is genuinely integrated into the survivor's post-traumatic selfhood.

Modalities of Spiritual Prosthesis

Spiritual prostheses come in several modalities, each of which corresponds to a kind of structure the survivor can invest. The first modality is reconstructed theology: a framework of beliefs about God, evil, suffering, and meaning that the survivor takes up and lives by after the pre-traumatic theology has been amputated. Post-Holocaust theology offers some of the most rigorously developed examples of reconstructed theology in this sense. Eliezer Berkovits's Faith After the Holocaust [28] is not a return to pre-Holocaust theology but a reconstruction that takes the trauma into account; Emil Fackenheim's 614th commandment — that Jews are forbidden to grant Hitler posthumous victories [29] — is a reconstructed imperative offered as theological prosthesis to a community whose pre-Holocaust religious world had been violated beyond repair. My own work on the dialectic of midas

hadin and midas harachamim in post-Holocaust thought [30] and on the dark Shekhinah in post-Holocaust theology [31] develops this line further.

The second modality is reconstructed practice: ritual, observance, prayer, meditation, somatic discipline, or therapeutic regimen taken up as the post-traumatic survivor's mode of inhabiting time. The Twelve-Step program is among the most clinically successful examples of reconstructed practice as spiritual prosthesis. The recovering addict — herself a trauma survivor in most cases — does not return to her pre-addiction self but constructs a new selfhood around a daily and weekly practice that becomes, with time, part of who she is [32-34]. The practice is offered from outside (it has authors, sponsors, traditions), but it must be invested with the participant's own subjectivity, and the difference between participation and integration is felt by every recovering addict.

The third modality is communal belonging. Trauma severs the survivor from their pre-traumatic community, and reintegration often requires the construction of a new community in which the post-traumatic self can be received. Veterans' groups, survivor circles, recovery fellowships, chevrot of various kinds — these are prosthetic communities. They are offered from outside; the survivor must invest in them; the investment, when it succeeds, produces a felt sense of belonging that becomes part of the post-traumatic self. The community is not merely a context for healing; it is itself a constituent of the post-traumatic identity. My recent work on Shekhinah consciousness in the therapeutic space develops this further: the community of healing functions as the locus of divine indwelling in a manner structurally analogous to how the historic chevra functioned for the Hasidic mystic [7,35].

The fourth modality is narrative repair. The survivor must construct a narrative of self that includes the trauma without being reducible to it. The work of narrative reconstruction is often what depth-oriented psychotherapy accomplishes when it accomplishes anything beyond symptom reduction. The narrative is the prosthesis. It must be coherent enough to support a livable life; it must be honest enough not to be denial; it must be the survivor's own, even when it is constructed in dialogue with a therapist or teacher.

The fifth modality is the felt presence of the divine. For survivors with religious orientations, the question of where God was during the trauma and where God is afterward is not optional. It is a question that demands an answer the survivor can live with. My recent work on revelation in concealment [8] argues that the divine, in the post-Holocaust and post-traumatic context, must be encountered not as the providential agent who allowed or prevented the trauma but as the accompanying presence that makes a post-traumatic life possible. The Shekhinah, in this account, is not the God who was absent; she is the divine presence that is itself in exile, that accompanies the exiled, that constitutes the felt sense of not-aloneness that makes survival liveable [35]. The Shekhinah, on this reading, is a prosthetic divinity — not less real for being prosthetic, but available to the survivor only through psychical investment.



What Makes a Prosthesis Spiritual

I should clarify what I mean by spiritual here, since the term is contested. I do not mean to restrict the spiritual prosthesis to explicitly religious frameworks. The construct applies wherever an externally offered structure of meaning is taken up by a trauma survivor as a way of reconstituting selfhood. The Stoic survivor of combat trauma who rebuilds his life around Marcus Aurelius is making use of a spiritual prosthesis in this sense; so is the secular survivor who invests in a therapeutic narrative of meaning-making and post-traumatic growth. What makes the prosthesis spiritual is not its religious content but its function: it addresses the ontological wound left by trauma rather than only the symptomatic surface.

At the same time, I would resist the dissolution of the spiritual into the merely psychological. The trauma survivor's need is not only for symptom relief or improved functioning; it is, as Herman saw, for a livable answer to the question of what kind of world they are now in. That question has a structure that religious and philosophical traditions have engaged for millennia and that contemporary clinical psychology engages incompletely. A robust theory of post-traumatic care must acknowledge that the question is real and that the structures capable of answering it have, historically, been religious as well as therapeutic [4,5].

Five Axes of Parallel Structure

Having articulated the architecture of prosthetic integration in section 2 and the construct of the spiritual prosthesis in section 4, I now develop the parallel structure along five axes. Each axis traces a feature of physical prosthetic integration to its analogue in the spiritual prosthesis and shows that the two are not merely metaphorically related but structurally homologous.

Disruption and Reconstruction of the Inner Imago

The first axis concerns what is disrupted and what must be

reconstructed. In physical amputation, the body image is disrupted: the inner representation of the body no longer corresponds to its outer reality, and a phantom limb persists in the absence of the limb itself [16]. The prosthesis must be integrated not into a body but into a body image that is itself in motion. In trauma, what is disrupted is what I will call the inner imago: the felt sense of self-in-world that constituted the pre-traumatic subject. This imago, like the body image, has structure that persists after its content has been amputated. The survivor inhabits a self whose inner representation has been altered while its memory of the pre-traumatic state remains accessible — a structural condition for the phenomenon of phantom presence I described in section 3.

The spiritual prosthesis, like the physical one, must be fitted not to a vacuum but to an inner imago that is in the process of reorganization. This has clinical implications. A theological framework offered too early — before the imago has begun to reorganize — will fail to integrate, much as a prosthesis fitted before the residuum has stabilized will not adhere. The post-trauma chaplain or therapist or rebbe must read the patient's readiness, and the patient's readiness is not their willingness to accept the framework but their inner state of reorganization. My work on hermeneutic approaches to medicine has emphasized this clinical-pastoral discernment as a core competence [6,11].

Symbolic Ambivalence

The second axis is symbolic ambivalence. Desmond and MacLachlan's observation that the same prosthesis can embody ability for one patient and disability for another [1] translates directly into the spiritual register. The same theological framework, the same ritual practice, the same community, the same narrative of meaning can function for one survivor as restored capacity and for another as a daily reminder of what has been lost. Two Holocaust survivors with similar histories can take up the same post-Holocaust theology — Berkovits's, say — and one finds it makes a livable life possible while the other finds it makes survival unbearable because every articulation reminds her of what is gone.

The symbolic ambivalence is irreducible. The clinician or pastor cannot pre-determine what a given framework will mean for a given patient. What they can do is offer the framework with sufficient interpretive openness that the patient can find their own meaning in it. This is what my theology of the patient as parable attempts to articulate [9]: the framework offered to the patient is a parable, capable of multiple readings, and the patient's reading is itself part of the therapeutic work. A pastoral or clinical practice that imposes a fixed reading forecloses the very interpretive process by which the prosthesis is invested.

This is also where the difference between rehabilitation as restoration and rehabilitation as reconstruction becomes acute. The patient who reads the prosthesis as restoration of the lost limb is set up for disappointment; the prosthesis cannot do that, and forcing it to mean restoration produces eventual rejection. The patient who reads the prosthesis as reconstruction — as a different way of being-in-the-world that incorporates the loss rather than denying it — has the interpretive posture that makes successful integration possible. The same is true of the spiritual prosthesis. The post-Holocaust theology that promises to restore pre-Holocaust faith is a worse prosthesis than the one that offers a different way of being a faithful Jew, one that incorporates the rupture rather than papering over it. This is the burden of my recent work on revelation in concealment and post-Holocaust embodied spirituality [8].



Phantom Phenomena

The third axis, perhaps the most theologically rich, is the persistence of phantom phenomena. The phantom limb is not the memory of the limb; it is the nervous system's continued representation of the limb in the form of sensation [16]. The phantom is present in absence, and its presence-in-absence is what produces phantom pain. In trauma, the phantom is the pre-traumatic self and the pre-traumatic world. These are present in absence: the survivor reaches for them, encounters their representation in dreams and reverie, briefly inhabits them before being returned to the post-traumatic state. The phantom of the pre-traumatic self produces a form of ache that is structurally identical to phantom limb pain: it is the experience of a presence that is no longer there.

The spiritual prosthesis must accommodate phantom pain. It cannot extinguish it; the attempt to extinguish phantom limb pain pharmacologically has been notoriously unsuccessful, and the same is true in the spiritual register. The post-trauma survivor cannot be talked out of mourning the pre-traumatic self. What the prosthesis can do is be worn over the phantom — to allow the survivor a life that includes the phantom rather than being interrupted by it. The successful integration is not the absence of phantom phenomena but their incorporation into a post-traumatic life that does not depend on their disappearance.

There is a further theological move here. In Lurianic Kabbalah, the divine is itself phantasmally present after the shattering of the vessels: the divine light remains in the shards as sparks (nitzotzot) that must be gathered through human action [2,7]. The hester panim, the concealment of the divine face, is not the

absence of God but God's presence-in-absence — a phantom divinity that aches for those who have known the unconcealed face. The survivor of trauma who experiences God as absent is not necessarily experiencing the death of God; they may be experiencing the phantom limb pain of a divine presence that is structurally there even though it cannot be directly accessed. This is what I have argued at length in The Wound as Altar [11,12]: the post-Holocaust divine is the divine of presence-in-absence, and theological reconstruction must learn to live with the phantom rather than denying it or replacing it.

Cosmesis versus Integration

The fourth axis is the difference between cosmesis and integration. I argued in section 2 that the prosthetic literature documents a phenomenon in which the prosthesis succeeds cosmetically — appears whole, functions adequately for social presentation — without being psychically invested. The patient appears integrated to observers but does not feel integrated to themselves. I propose to name the spiritual analogue cosmetic theology: a theological framework that the survivor wears in public but does not inhabit, that allows them to pass as recovered without actually being recovered.

Cosmetic theology is a recognizable clinical phenomenon. The trauma survivor who returns to religious observance, who can articulate the doctrines of their tradition, who attends services, who recites prayers — and who feels none of it, who experiences the practice as a costume rather than a clothing of the self — is wearing a cosmetic theology. The framework is doing the work of social presentation but is not invested. Such survivors are often misidentified by their communities as having successfully recovered. They often misidentify themselves, until some crisis or fatigue reveals that the theology was prosthetic only in the bad sense — externally applied without being integrated.

The clinical and pastoral task, then, is to recognize cosmetic theology and gently to invite the patient toward integration. This is delicate work. To name cosmetic theology too directly is to risk shaming the patient for the only mode of practice currently available to them; cosmetic practice is often the bridge to integration, and the pastor or clinician who removes the bridge too soon leaves the patient stranded. But to leave cosmetic theology unaddressed is to allow a kind of spiritual stagnation in which the survivor performs wholeness without becoming whole. My recent work on the tensions between evidence-based practice and spiritual frameworks [36] explores some of the methodological questions involved in this discernment.

Lifespan Fluctuation

The fifth axis is lifespan fluctuation. The amputee's relationship to the prosthesis changes across time, modulated by aging, by new losses, by developmental transitions, by re-interpretations of the original trauma [1]. The same is true of the spiritual prosthesis. A theological framework that integrated successfully in the first decade after trauma may need to be re-invested or replaced as the survivor encounters new losses, ages into different existential concerns, or revisits the trauma at developmentally significant moments (the death of a parent who was alive when the original trauma occurred; the entry of a child into the age the survivor was when traumatized; the diagnosis of one's own mortal illness).

This has important implications for the clinical and pastoral disciplines. A successful integration is not a stable end-state; it must be re-achieved across the lifespan. The clinician or pastor who imagines that recovery is completed at the end of formal treatment is operating with a defective model. The relationship to the prosthesis — physical or spiritual — is lifelong. My recent work on age-responsive spiritual care has begun to articulate this dimension explicitly, framing the therapeutic space as itself evolving with the patient's developmental position [37].



The Lurianic Architecture: Theological Grammar for Prosthetic Integration

What the clinical literature describes in psychological vocabulary, the Lurianic tradition describes in theological vocabulary. The two vocabularies are not in competition; they are addressing the same phenomena from different methodological angles. I want now to retrieve the Lurianic architecture I have developed across prior work and show how each of its central concepts illuminates the prosthetic integration model.

Tzimtzum as Methodological Posture

Tzimtzum, the divine self-contraction by which the Lurianic creation account begins [38], names in the theological register what the prosthetic literature describes as the clinician's methodological posture. The prosthetist cannot install integration; she can only provide a device fitted with sufficient precision that the patient is able to invest it. To provide that fit, she must contract her own agency, must restrain the impulse to determine the patient's relation to the device, must hold the space in which the patient's investment can occur. My prior work on the tzimtzum model of the doctor-patient relationship [39] develops this at length: the clinician's posture is one of self-restraint, of making space, of withholding the impulse to fill. The same is true of the pastoral clinician offering a theological framework. The framework cannot be imposed; it can only be offered with the kind of restrained presence that allows the patient to take it up or not.

This is the theological grammar for what Desmond and MacLachlan describe when they note that the prosthesis must become psychically invested before it can be extension of self. Investment is the patient's act; the clinician's act is to make space for it. Tzimtzum is the methodological description of that space-making.

Shevirat HaKelim and the Shattering of the Pre-Traumatic Self

Shevirat ha-kelim, the shattering of the vessels [38], names the catastrophic event that Lurianic cosmology places at the origin of our broken world. The divine light, in the original cosmogonic process, overwhelmed the vessels meant to contain it, and they shattered. Sparks of light were scattered into the resulting chaos, lodging in fragments of the broken vessels, requiring gathering through human action. The Lurianic creation is, in this sense, founded on a primal trauma; the world begins broken.

I have argued elsewhere that this provides a theological grammar for trauma more generally [4,40]. The trauma survivor's pre-traumatic self is a vessel that has shattered. It cannot be reassembled; the shards do not fit back together. What is required is not restoration but tikkun: the gathering of the sparks that remain in the shards into a different kind of vessel, one whose structure incorporates the rupture rather than denying it. The shevirat ha-kelim provides the theological grammar for why restoration is not the appropriate goal of post-traumatic care. The vessel that shattered cannot be remade. The survivor must build a different vessel, one whose structure includes the rupture.

Tikkun as Prosthetic Reconstruction

Tikkun, the work of repair or rectification, names the process by which the post-shevirah cosmos is gradually restored to wholeness through human action [38,41]. Tikkun is not a return to pre-shevirah unity; it is the construction of a new kind of unity that incorporates the memory and the structural effect of the shattering. In the theological register, tikkun is what humans do; in the clinical register, tikkun is the prosthetic work. The trauma survivor is engaged in tikkun: gathering the sparks of pre-traumatic life that remain available to her and integrating them into a post-traumatic selfhood that is not pre-traumatic restoration but is genuinely a life. The spiritual prosthesis is the structure through which this tikkun is performed.

My recent work on Sacred Healing, Shattered Vessels, comparing Breslov tikkun habrit practice with Twelve-Step recovery [33], develops this directly. The recovering addict is engaged in tikkun: gathering the broken pieces of her life into a new structure, one whose practice includes daily acts of repair and reconnection. The recovery program is the prosthesis through which the tikkun is performed. It is offered from outside; she must invest it; the investment, when it succeeds, produces a self that is genuinely post-addiction rather than merely abstinent.

The Vav Ketia: Inhabiting Fracture

The vav ketia, the fractured vav, is a Hebrew letter form that appears in the Torah scroll at specific points where the standard vav is interrupted by a break in its vertical stroke. I have argued at length that this letter form constitutes a theology of sacred brokenness [42,43]: the vav is not made whole again but is read in its fracture, and its fracture is itself the bearer of meaning. The vav ketia provides a graphic icon for what the prosthetic integration model describes. The integrated self after trauma is not a self-made whole again. It is a self whose fracture is incorporated into its structure. The successful integration is the fractured vav: a structure that retains its rupture and reads as meaningful precisely through that rupture.

This is the deepest theological resource the Lurianic tradition offers to trauma theory. The post-traumatic self is the vav ketia. It is not restored; it is constituted in its fracture. The spiritual prosthesis is not what makes the survivor whole again; it is what allows the fracture to be inhabited as meaningful structure. To borrow the formulation from the prosthetic literature: the prosthesis becomes extension of self when the user reads the prosthesis as part of how they now relate to the world. The fractured vav becomes integrated selfhood when the survivor reads the fracture as part of how they now relate to God and to the world.

Hester Panim as Theological Phantom Limb

Hester panim, the concealment of the divine face [44], names the experience of divine absence that recurs throughout post-Holocaust and trauma theology. The survivor often experiences God as having withdrawn, as no longer present, as concealed. I have argued in The Wound as Altar and related papers [12,11] that this concealment is not the death of God but the phantom presence of God: God is present in absence, as the absent limb is present in absence. The hester panim is the theological phantom limb. The survivor reaches for the divine face they once knew and encounters concealment, but the concealment is itself a mode of presence — God is hidden, not gone. The ache of hester panim is the ache of phantom divinity, and it functions in the survivor's post-traumatic religious life the way phantom limb pain functions in the amputee's post-amputation embodied life.

The spiritual prosthesis must accommodate the hester panim as the physical prosthesis must accommodate phantom limb pain. It cannot make the ache disappear. What it can do is allow a religious life that incorporates the concealment, that lives faithfully with the hidden God rather than requiring divine self-disclosure as the precondition for faith. This is the burden of post-Holocaust Jewish theology at its most rigorous [29,28]; it is also the burden of post-traumatic spiritual care at its most honest.

The Asymmetry Critique Addressed Head-On

The strongest objection to the spiritual prosthesis construct is the asymmetry between physical and spiritual prosthetic integration. The physical prosthesis is fabricated, fitted, and adjusted by an external technician; the patient's role is partially receptive. The spiritual prosthesis cannot be fabricated externally in the same way; what counts as the patient's framework, practice, community, or felt presence of the divine is irreducibly the survivor's own

construction, however shaped by external offerings. The objection runs: doesn't this asymmetry undermine the metaphor? Doesn't it mean that the spiritual prosthesis isn't really a prosthesis but only loosely analogous to one?

I want to address this objection directly, for three reasons. First, intellectual honesty: the asymmetry is real and pretending otherwise would weaken the argument. Second, the engagement with the objection reveals something important about both physical and spiritual prosthetic integration that is obscured if we accept the asymmetry uncritically. Third, the resolution of the objection produces clinical implications that would not otherwise be available.

The Symmetric Element: Investment is Always the Patient's

The first response is that the asymmetry is smaller than it first appears, because the integrative element in physical prosthetic fitting is also irreducibly the patient's. Desmond and MacLachlan are precise on this point: the prosthesis becomes part of the self only through psychical investment, and that investment is the patient's act [1]. The prosthetist cannot install integration any more than the pastor or therapist can install faith. The prosthetist can fit a device with mechanical precision; whether the device becomes extension of self depends on whether the patient invests it. The physical literature is explicit that this investment is the variable that determines outcome — that two patients with identical injuries and identical fittings can have radically different rehabilitation outcomes depending on whether the integration occurs.

If we take this seriously, the asymmetry between physical and spiritual prosthetic integration is asymmetry only with respect to the externally fabricated component of the integration. The fabrication is external in physical prosthesis and largely external in spiritual prosthesis (the tradition, the framework, the practice are offered from outside the individual). The fitting is partly external in physical prosthesis (a technician shapes the socket) but largely internal in spiritual prosthesis (the survivor shapes how the framework fits their post-traumatic state). The investment is irreducibly the patient's in both cases. The asymmetry, then, is real but only at the fitting stage, not at the integration stage. And the integration stage is where the prosthesis becomes a prosthesis at all.

The Clinician/Pastor as Enabler, Not Installer

The second response is to articulate what the clinician or pastor can and cannot do, in terms that apply across the physical-spiritual analogy. What the prosthetist does is provide a fitted device, with sufficient precision and customization that the patient is enabled to invest it. What the prosthetist cannot do is the investing. What the pastor or therapist does is offer a framework, practice, or community, with sufficient interpretive openness that the patient is enabled to invest it. What the pastor or therapist cannot do is the investing. In both cases, the professional's role is enabling: making available the structure that the patient can take up if they are able and willing. The structure is necessary; it is also insufficient. Integration requires both the structure and the investment, and the investment cannot be supplied from outside.

This collapses the strongest form of the asymmetry critique. The critique imagines the prosthetist as installer and the pastor as enabler, with the asymmetry consisting in the difference between installation and enablement. But the prosthetic literature itself does not allow the prosthetist to be characterized as installer in the strong sense. The prosthetist enables; the patient integrates. The professional roles in physical and spiritual prosthetic care are structurally similar in being enabling rather than constituting, and the asymmetry between them is one of degree rather than kind.

The Hermeneutic Resolution

The third response is more theoretical and concerns the inside-outside binary that the asymmetry critique presupposes. The critique assumes that the physical prosthesis is external to the patient (it is fabricated outside and applied to the body) while the spiritual prosthesis is internal to the patient (it is constructed within their subjectivity). But the hermeneutic perspective I have developed across my work on hermeneutic medicine [6,11,45] dissolves this binary. The integrated physical prosthesis is no longer external; it is part of the self. The integrated theological framework is not merely internal; it has a structure given from outside and held in common with others who share the tradition. The inside-outside binary applies cleanly to neither.

What both forms of integration share is a hermeneutic process by which an external structure becomes internal through interpretive investment. The patient interprets the prosthesis (as ability or disability, as restoration or marker of loss, as extension of self or external appliance), and the interpretation determines integration. The survivor interprets the theological framework (as restoration or reconstruction, as cosmetic or genuine, as constraining or liberating), and the interpretation determines integration. The hermeneutic moment is the same in both cases; what differs is the kind of object being interpreted. The asymmetry between physical and spiritual prosthesis is, on the hermeneutic resolution, a difference in the medium of the prosthesis, not a difference in the structure of integration.

This is the deepest answer to the objection. The spiritual prosthesis is structurally a prosthesis because what makes the physical prosthesis a prosthesis is the hermeneutic process by which the patient invests it, and that same process is what makes the spiritual structure a prosthesis when it is genuinely integrated. The metaphor is not loose analogy but structural identity at the level of

the integrative process.

Case Illustration

No theoretical construct is fully credible until tested against a hard case, and the hardest case I can imagine for the spiritual prosthesis construct is the Warsaw Ghetto. There, between 1939 and 1943, Rabbi Kalonymous Kalman Shapira — the Piaseczner Rebbe, also known by the title of his posthumous work Aish Kodesh (Sacred Fire) — continued to teach Torah weekly to his Hasidic community under conditions of progressive starvation, deportation, and mass murder [46]. His sermons, buried in milk cans in the ghetto and recovered after the war, constitute one of the most extraordinary documents in twentieth-century Jewish thought. They are also, I want to suggest, the clearest historical example of a spiritual prosthesis being constructed in real time under conditions of extremity.

What Shapira does in the Warsaw sermons is not return his community to pre-war Hasidic faith. Pre-war Hasidic faith assumed a providential order that the ghetto manifestly violates. Shapira is theologically rigorous enough not to pretend that the pre-war assumptions remain intact. Instead, he develops, week by week, a theology that allows his community to remain faithful Jews under conditions that the pre-war theology cannot accommodate. He draws on classical Hasidic sources — the Sfas Emes, the Berditchever, his own Piaseczner lineage — but he reads them through the lens of the present catastrophe. He develops a theology in which God's suffering and the suffering of Israel are bound together, in which the divine itself is in exile and accompanies the exiled community, in which the work of faith under extremity is to maintain the relation with the divine even when the divine cannot intervene [8,46].

This theology is, in the terms I have developed, a spiritual prosthesis being constructed in vivo. The pre-war religious world has been amputated; what fills the absence is not a return to pre-war faith but a reconstructed theological framework that incorporates the rupture. Shapira offers this framework to his community; the community must invest it; the investment, where it occurred, allowed religious life to continue under conditions that would otherwise have rendered it impossible. Some of his hearers did not invest; some lost their faith entirely; some inhabited a kind of cosmetic theology in which they performed observance without inner participation. But for those who invested, the Aish Kodesh theology functioned as prosthesis: an externally articulated structure of meaning, taken up and made part of the post-traumatic self.

What is striking about the Aish Kodesh, theologically, is its anticipation of the structural features I have outlined. It explicitly addresses the phantom presence of pre-war faith — Shapira does not pretend the community has not lost what it has lost. It accommodates the hester panim, the concealment of the divine face, as the present mode of divine presence rather than as divine absence. It avoids cosmetic theology by refusing to offer easy consolations. It is offered with tzimtzum: Shapira does not impose his readings but offers them with extraordinary interpretive humility, knowing that not all his hearers will be able to invest them. The work is one of accompanying the community in the construction of a prosthetic faith that the community itself must carry [46].

The Piaseczner Rebbe was murdered at Trawniki in 1943; his theology survives because his community, or part of it, invested it sufficiently to bury the manuscripts. The buried manuscripts are themselves an image: the prosthesis was preserved against the destruction of the body that carried it, and was offered to a future community that would also need to invest it, or not. Post-Holocaust readers of the Aish Kodesh have inherited Shapira's prosthetic theology and have invested it in their own ways; my recent work on revelation in concealment and on the wound as altar [8,12] is one such investment. The construction of a spiritual prosthesis is, in this sense, a multi-generational work.

Clinical Implications for Hermeneutic Medicine

I want now to draw out the clinical implications of the construct I have developed. These are not exhaustive; they are the implications that follow most directly from the prosthetic-integration model and that bear on the practice of hermeneutic medicine as I have developed it across prior work [6,11,45].

Assessment as Hermeneutic Act

The first implication is that assessment of the post-traumatic patient is itself a hermeneutic act. The clinician is not measuring an objective psychological state but reading a patient's interpretive relation to the structures available to them. Standard PTSD assessment instruments — the PCL-5, the CAPS — measure symptom presence and severity but do not measure prosthetic integration. The patient who scores low on symptom inventories may still be inhabiting a cosmetic theology; the patient who scores high may be in the early stages of genuine integration. The clinical task, then, is to read the patient's relation to their own meaning-making structures, not only to count their symptoms. My work on the patient as sacred text [6,45] articulates the hermeneutic competence required for this reading.

The Therapeutic Space as Fitting Room

The second implication is that the therapeutic space — the consulting room, the chaplain's office, the recovery meeting, the sanctuary — functions as the fitting room in which prosthetic integration is attempted. The space must be designed for that function. It must be characterized by tzimtzum: the clinician's self-restraint that makes investment possible. It must be characterized by hermeneutic openness: the willingness to encounter the patient's interpretation rather than to impose one's own. It must be characterized by sustained presence: the time and continuity that integration requires. My ongoing work on healing space design [47,48] addresses some of the architectural and procedural dimensions of this fitting room.

The Clinician's Role: Enabler, Not Installer

The third implication, following from the resolution of the asymmetry critique, is that the clinician's role in post-traumatic care is enabling rather than constituting. The clinician offers structures — frameworks, practices, narratives, communities — with sufficient interpretive openness that the patient can invest them. The clinician does not invest them on the patient's behalf. This requires a particular discipline. The clinician must offer enough structure that the patient has something to invest; she must withhold enough that the patient's investment is her own. The discipline is in the dosage. Offer too little structure and the patient has nothing to take up; offer too much and the patient is filling someone else's prosthesis with their own selfhood, which is not integration but compliance.

Markers of Integration Versus Cosmetic Theology

The fourth implication is that the clinician needs markers to distinguish genuine integration from cosmetic theology. The prosthetic literature offers some guidance. The integrated prosthesis is used spontaneously, including in private settings; the cosmetic prosthesis is used dutifully, primarily in public. The integrated prosthesis is mourned when removed for maintenance; the cosmetic prosthesis is felt as relief when removed. The integrated prosthesis is part of how the patient talks about themselves; the cosmetic prosthesis is something the patient talks about. These markers translate. The integrated theological framework is invoked spontaneously in moments of difficulty; the cosmetic framework is invoked only when others are watching. The integrated practice is missed when interrupted; the cosmetic practice is felt as obligation. The integrated narrative is told in different ways in different contexts; the cosmetic narrative is told in the same way to everyone. These are imperfect markers, but they give the clinician something to look for [49].

The Lifespan View

The fifth implication is that post-traumatic care is lifespan care. The prosthesis must be sustained, adjusted, sometimes replaced as the patient ages and encounters new losses. The clinician who imagines that the work is completed at the end of formal treatment is mistaken. The clinician who maintains a relationship with the patient across decades — even episodically — is in a better position to support the ongoing work of integration than the one who treats post-traumatic care as a discrete episode. My work on time horizons in the therapeutic space [37] develops this lifespan view explicitly.

Conclusion: The Prosthetic Self

I have argued that the architecture of physical prosthetic integration, as articulated by Desmond and MacLachlan in their twenty-five-year review of Prosthetics and Orthotics International, describes with structural precision what happens to the survivor of trauma when post-traumatic care succeeds. The pre-traumatic self is amputated; what fills the absence is not a return to the pre-traumatic state but a structure that the survivor must invest with their own subjectivity until it becomes constitutive of post-traumatic selfhood. I have called this structure the spiritual prosthesis and have developed five axes — disruption and reconstruction of the inner imago, symbolic ambivalence, phantom phenomena, cosmesis versus integration, lifespan fluctuation — along which the parallel holds.

I have argued that the Lurianic theological vocabulary I have developed across prior work provides the theological grammar for what the clinical literature has been describing in psychological vocabulary: tzimtzum names the clinician's methodological posture, shevirat ha-kelim names the trauma, tikkun names the prosthetic reconstruction, the vav ketia names the integrated self that retains its fracture, and hester panim names the phantom presence of the divine in the post-traumatic religious life.

I have addressed the strongest objection to the construct — the asymmetry between externally fabricated physical prosthesis and irreducibly internal spiritual prosthesis — and argued that the asymmetry collapses under scrutiny of the prosthetic literature itself. The investment is the patient's in both cases; the clinician's role is enabling rather than installing in both cases; the hermeneutic process by which an external structure becomes internal is the same in both cases. The asymmetry is one of medium, not structure.

Finally, I have offered the Piaseczner Rebbe's Warsaw Ghetto theology as historical case illustration of a spiritual prosthesis constructed in real time under conditions of extremity, and have drawn out clinical implications for hermeneutic medicine: assessment as hermeneutic act, the therapeutic space as fitting room, the clinician's role as enabler, the markers that distinguish integration from cosmetic theology, and the lifespan view of post-traumatic care.

The prosthetic self is not a diminished self. The amputee whose prosthesis has become extension of self is not less embodied than the non-amputee; she is embodied differently, with a body whose extension includes the device. The survivor of trauma whose spiritual prosthesis has been genuinely integrated is not less themselves than they were before the trauma; they are themselves differently, with a selfhood whose structure includes the rupture and the structures by which the rupture is inhabited. The successful integration is not restoration. It is, in the language of the vav ketia, the inhabitation of fracture as meaningful structure. It is the construction of a self that includes what has happened to it without

being reducible to it. This is the work of trauma recovery; it is also the work of theology after the Holocaust; it is also, I have argued, the work of prosthetic rehabilitation; and the structural identity of these three works is what permits a unified clinical, pastoral, and theological account of post-traumatic care.

What Fishman observed in 1977 — that the successful fitting of a prosthesis lies in the psychology of the wearer rather than in any physical problem [12] — turns out to be a remark of theological depth. The technology can be perfected; the wearer must still be invested. The same is true of every theology, every ritual, every framework offered to the survivor of trauma. The structures can be refined; the survivor must still invest them. And the work of clinical-pastoral care is to make the investment possible — to fit the prosthesis with sufficient precision and to hold the space with sufficient restraint that the patient can do what only the patient can do: take up what has been offered and make it part of how they now live.

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